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The  traditional  theory  of  economic  policy  of  the  Tinbergen-Theil-type  has  come 
under  severe  criticism:  in  the  ontological  setting  of  the  New  Classical 
Macroeconomics based on the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH), economic 
policy  is  ineffective  or  neutral  with  respect  to  real  variables.  In  the  ontological 
setting of Hayekian economics based on informational deficiencies, economic policy 
is  without  orientation  and,  therefore,  more  harm-  than  helpful.  Therefore,  both 
criticisms are united in their rejection of state interventions. In this paper, a Post 
Keynesian  alternative  will  be  presented  which  is  situated  between  nomocratic 
abstinence and teleological controllability.  
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A Post Keynesian theory of economic policy – filling a void 
 
Arne Heise, Hamburg University 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
If one is asked to briefly characterise Keynesianism, one surely would be directed 
towards  certain  policy  orientations  which  may  be  dubbed  as  ‘easy  money’  and 
‘discretionary  fiscal  policy’  as  they  are  the  most  prominent  ones.  Although  they 
follow from hydraulic ISLM Keynesianism which has lost a lot of its appeal over the 
past three decades and has never been accepted by Post Keynesians as appropriate 
interpretation of Keynes’ opus magnum, still most Post Keynesians would probably 
willingly subscribe to the above-mentioned policy tools as instruments, perhaps still 
most important instruments, of macroeconomic fine-tuning of an otherwise unstable 
economy (see e.g. Arestis/Sawyer 1998 and the articles in Gnos/Rochon 2006)
1. This 
is quite interesting to realise as on the one hand, Post Keynesians are far from being 
united over theoretical issues explaining the laws of motion of the unstable economy 
(see e.g. Dunn 2000; Holt/Pressman 2001a; Davidson 2005; Lavoie 2005) and, on 
the  other  hand,  neither  in  Keynes’  General  Theory  nor  in  most  Post  Keynesian 
textbooks do we find a distinct chapter on ‘Economic policy’ or the like
2.  
 
This  appears  to  suggest  that  despite  all  theoretical  differences  among  Post 
Keynesians  and  between  Post  and  standard  Keynesians,  i.e.  however  ‘Keynesian 
results’  of  lasting  unemployment  and  the  instability  of  capitalist  economies  are 
derived,  ‘Keynesian’  policy  proposals  always  end  up  very  similar  and  almost 
uncontested.
3 Probably, that is why no distinct Post Keynesian theory of economic 
policy has been elaborated other than a number of partial policy measures seemingly 
following from any kind of ‘Keynesian’ theorising. However, the theory of economic 
policy is not merely concerned with a single or a bundle of policy instruments being 
simply imposed on a theoretical model, but is the doctrine that is concerned with the 
systematic  relations  of  means  and  ends  in  order  to  achieve  overall  welfare 
maximisation (policy  dimension). This not only touches upon the optimal use of 
scarce resources by the political actor (polity dimension) but also on questions about 
the willingness of political actors to behave in a certain way and to achieve what has 
been normatively set (politics dimension)
4. 
                                                 
1 Some  years ago, a  mini-symposium  in the Journal of  Post Keynesian Economics discussed the 
question  of  the  viability  of  Keynesian  policies  raised  by  Cunningham/Vilasuso  (1994/95).  The 
contributions by many prominent Post Keynesians were irritating in the respect that most of them 
attributed  ‘Keynesian  demand  management’  somewhat  disaffectedly  to  standard  or  bastard 
Keynesianism, yet did not present any recognisable alternative and seemingly accepted it as - albeit 
narrow - representation of Keynesian policy.   
2 See e.g. Davidson (1994), Palley (1996), Lavoie (2006). Also, in both ‚Guides to Post-Keynesian 
economics’ (Eichner 1979; Holt/Pressman 2001) there is no chapter on economic policy.  
3 Actually, also Keynes’ original, policy-related work supports this view: see e.g. Keynes (1931); 
Keynes (1933). 
4 For a distinction of the different dimensions see Witt (2003).   3 
 
Traditionally, the policy and the polity dimensions of economic policy-making on 
the one hand are separated from the politics dimension which is left to the political 
science or which has carved out its own disciplinary niche: (new) political economy
5. 
Although this separation somewhat artificially disassociates the question of the need 
and  ability  to  intervene  into  economic  interactions  on  the  one  hand  from  the 
willingness to do so and from vested interests and power relations in (economic) 
politics  on  the  other,  there  is  good  analytical  reason  to  distinguish  between  the 
normative and the positive theory of economic policy: the former is concerned with 
efficiency  matters  (sometimes  termed  ‘output  legitimacy’)  being  typically  the 
domain  of  economic  rationality,  while  the  latter  is  concerned  with  effectiveness 
matters  (‘input  legitimacy’)  being  the  domain  of  political  rationality.  Although  I 
strongly  advocate  not  to  forget  the  one  over  the  other,  I  will  concentrate  on  the 
normative approach to economic policy-making here, i.e. I will pose the question 
whether  the  traditional  theory  of  economic  policy  is  appropriate  from  a  Post 
Keynesian perspective and, if not so, how the features of a Post Keynesian theory of 
economic policy may look like. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Firstly, a brief overview of the traditional theory 
of economic policy and its critics is given. Then a Post Keynesian alternative will be 
outlined  and  the  distinctions  between  teleological  ‘controllability’,  nomocratic 
‘abstinence’ and ‘constrained feasibility’ elaborated. The focus will be placed on the 
institutional  context  of  Post  Keynesian  policymaking  rather  than  on  supposedly 
novel policy instruments or a novel application of them. The paper ends with a brief 
confrontation of the different approaches. 
 
 
2.  The traditional theory of economic policy  
 
Economic policy-making is concerned with reducing the variance of actual outcomes 
of such economic variables from their desired values that are supposed to determine 
the welfare of a society – and to do so at minimum cost. This, of course, implies a) 
the  ability  to  specify  objectives  or  ordered  configurations  of  objectives  (welfare 
functions) as dependent variables on the one hand and knowledge about instruments 
in linear causality to such objectives as independent variables on the other; 2) at least 
as many (independent) instruments as there are (independent) objectives; 3) exogeny 
of  instruments  in  a  control  sense  and  4)  unitarity  of  the  political  actor  who  is 
controlling  the  instruments  (see  Acocella/Di  Bartolomeo  2007).  If  we  add  the 
assumption that the difference of actual from targeted variables only occurs due to 
market failures (i.e. information deficiencies or price and quantity rigidities) we have 
briefly summarized the traditional theory of economic policy based on the seminal 
works  of  Tinbergen  (1952)  and  Theil  (1956)  which  are  grounded  in  Walrasian 
                                                 
5 Certainly, Public Choice is the most prominent and dominant school of New Political Economy (see 
Mueller (1989) and Besley (2007) for the newest developments ) but there are also other approaches 
from a constructivist orientation (see e.g. Heise 2005).     4 
welfare economics
6 – a ‘market repair theory of economic policy’ as Riese (1986: 
178) dubbed it. The political actor is different from the market actors in the respect 
that he has control over the exogenous variables (means) while the market actors 
have not (see Eggertsson 1997: 1189). They simply have to accept the outcome of 
the endogenous (dependent) variables (ends), which, if policy is being conducted in 
an appropriate way, will optimise society’s welfare. However, as the famous ‘Lucas 
critique’  argued  convincingly  –  at  least  against  the  background  of  Walrasian 
economics - , the efficiency of economic policy in a quantitative, teleological manner 
depends crucially on information and, therefore, expectation problems. For, if we 
assume rational expectations in the ordinary sense, market actors will anticipate the 
behaviour  and  the  respective  outcome  of  the  political  actor,  for  instance 
expansionary monetary or fiscal policies, and adjust their behaviour accordingly
7 – 
the  result  being  a  welfare  loss  for  society  but  an  increase  (e.g.  rents  for  certain 
market participants) in utility for individuals or collective actors (such as cartels or 
unions).  Therefore,  quantitative  economic  policy  in  the  Tinbergen-Theil  mould, 
elaborated during the hay-days of socio-technocracy, appears to be valid only in the 
short  period  under  sticky  expectations,  while  structural  economic  policy  (or 
Ordnungspolitik  in  German),  changing  the  structural  environment  of  markets,  is 
appropriate in the long period
8 in order to re-establish the conditions of exogeny of 
independent variables and endogeny of dependent variables. With the shift in the 
dominant  economic  discourse  away  from  market  failures  towards  government 
failures, a shift from quantitative to structural economic policy can be observed; or to 
put  it  differently:  (de-)regulating  markets  has  become  much  more  a  focus  of 
economic policy-making than intervening into (existing) markets. 
 
 
3.  Critique to the traditional theory of economic policy – limits to market 
repair 
 
The traditional theory of economic policy in its quantitative (i.e. market intervention 
or market repair) orientation has come under criticism not only by the Lucas critique 
but  more  generally  with  respect  to  the  assumption  of  a  unitary  policy  actor,  the 
assumption of endogeny of independent variables (means) for the market actors and, 
indeed, the assumption of information problems underlying market failures in the 
first place (see Acocella/DiBartolomeo 2007). Once the political actor falls apart into 
different authorities (agents) forming own and independent preferences (such as the 
independent Central Bank and the Fiscal authorities for instance) and market actors 
are able to assert impacts on the endogenous variables (such as trade unions on the 
                                                 
6 Walrasian welfare economics allows to circumvent the problems of Arrow’s ‘Impossibility theorem’ 
in  so  far  as  Pareto  optimality  merely  follows  from  individual  utility  maximisation.  The  general 
equilibrium outcomes – as targets – therefore need not to be derived from the specification of a 
separate welfare function.   
7  „The  New  Classical  macro  was  probably  best  known  for  ist  classical  policy  ineffectiveness 
propositions that publicly announced demand management policies would be completely offset by the 
utulity  and  profit-maximizing  responses  of  agents  with  rational  expectations.  Economic  policies 
simply could not matter in a pure New Classical economy“ (Wible 2004: 127). 
8 For a distinction see Eggertsson (1997: 1190).   5 
price level for instance), the ‘controllability’ inherent in linear means-ends-systems 
of the Tinbergen-Theil type is lost.
9  It can only be re-established when targets are 
unambiguously assigned to single actors (such as price stabilisation to the Central 
Bank or employment determination to the trade unions) and clear-cut policy rules 
(such as the monetarist quantity rule for monetary policy or the productivity rule for 
wage policy) specified – compliance to these rules implies the preponderance of a 
cooperative Nash equilibrium; or to put it more succinctly: all cooperation problems 
featuring so prominently in ‘policy games’ since Barro/Gordon (1983) and Nordhaus 
(1994)  are  simply  banned,  a  working  assignment  can  be  interpreted  as  ruling 
strategic behaviour out or, which comes to the same conclusions, as a particular form 
of cooperative behaviour. It is, however, not very convincing simply to request from 
political  and  market  actors  what  game  theory  predicts  to  be  rather  unlikely: 
‘irrationality without regret’ (see Frank 2005).  
 
Strategic  behaviour  of  actors  refers  yet  to  another  problem  of  the  teleological 
postulates of the traditional theory of economic policy: complexity. A system (i.e. 
economic reality) is supposed to be complex by the degree n, if it can assume n 
different  states  of  development  (and,  hence,  becomes  contingent  in  the  possible 
outcomes).  Only  under  the  assumption  of  n  =  1,  the  system  can  be  called 
deterministic and linear means-ends-relations are possible.
10 Yet, it is a very strong, 
heroic  assumption  which  has  been  convincingly  questioned  by  the  late  Friedrich 
August von Hayek (1964; 1975). According to Hayek, economic systems are not 
only complicated in the sense that an immense amount of information about present 
and future developments needs to be collected and processed – which in itself may 
overburden the economic and political actors – but, more important, their evolution 
in historical time is open (‘contingent’) and, therefore, unknown and unpredictable. 
This poses insurmountable problems to the common rationality postulate and, thus, 
optimisation  pretensions  raised  against  economic  and  political  actors.  It  is  very 
interesting  to  see  how  this  insight  leads  to  different  recommendations  for  the 
behaviour of (private) economic actors on the one hand and the (public) political 
actor on the other: according to Hayek and the Hayekians, there are two devices of 
paramount  importance  which  allow  the  actual  path  of  individual  (economic  and 
social) interaction to convergence towards that evolutionary path which would have 
been chosen as optimal if ex post information were available ex ante: the principles 
of  self-regulation  (i.e.  market  interaction)  and  self-control  (i.e.  atomistic 
competition). As long as the market functions as ‘discovery procedure’ (see Hayek 
1978), even under conditions of complexity of higher degree (i.e. n > 1 or, as Hayek 
called  it,  ‘organized  complexity’),  the  ‘pattern  prediction’  (Muster-Voraussage  in 
German) of Hayekian economics follows general equilibrium dynamics. Hence, the 
political actor, who should not pretend to have more or more accurate knowledge, is 
not supposed to act as ‘market repairer’ but should simply provide the framework 
                                                 
9 This has partly been understood since the early 1960s when Bent Hansen (1963) published a largely 
neglected book. 
10 Dequech (2001: 913) argues: „In a broad, general sense, complex merely means complicated“. To 
make it entirely clear, this is not a correct statement in general and certainly not the definition of 
complexity I am using here.   6 
(Ordnung in German) for self-regulation (i.e. clearly specified property rights and 
systems of contracts) and self-control (i.e. clearly specified and binding competition 
laws):  
 
“Of  course,  compared  with  the  precise  predictions  we  have  learnt  to 
expect in the physical sciences, this sort of mere pattern prediction is a 
second best with which one does not like to have to be content. Yet the 
danger of which I want to warn is precisely the belief that in order to 
have a claim to be accepted as scientific it is necessary to achieve more. 
This  way  lies  charlatanism  and  worse.  To  act  on  the  believe  that  we 
possess  the  knowledge  and  the  power  which  enables  us  to  shape  the 
processes of society entirely to our liking, knowledge which in fact we do 
not possess, is likely to make us do harm.” (Hayek 1975: 441)  
 
 
4.  A  market  participation  theory  of  economic  policy  –  advent  of  a  Post 
Keynesian alternative? 
 
The somewhat lengthy statement is supposed to show clearly Hayekian reluctance 
towards  economic  policy  interventions  as  the  other  extreme  of  economic  policy-
making on Walrasian foundations: traditional determinism in the Tinbergen-Theil 
world allows for teleocratic controllability, whereas Hayekian complexity demands 
nomocratic abstinence
11. Where does a Post Keynesian theory of economic policy fit 
in? 
 
Although,  as  mentioned  earlier,  Post  Keynesianism  is  far  from  being  a  coherent 
theoretical body, no one referring to the work of John Maynard Keynes can seriously 
sustain  the  idea  of  a  deterministic  world.  Complexity  shows  in  such  contingent 
developments which made Keynes emphasise fundamental uncertainty as compared 
to deterministic risk.
12 Information problems do not simply stem from an asymmetric 
distribution  of  information,  processing  difficulties  or  stochastic  shocks,  but  they 
characterise  an  ‘non-ergodic’  world  (Davidson  1994:  89ff.)  in  which  many 
information simply do not exist when decisions need to be taken – most importantly, 
the future is not only unknown and unpredictable but simply non-existent and, thus, 
will only be shaped after decisions have been taken. 
 
Keynes  was  painfully  aware  that  under  conditions  of  complexity  and,  hence, 
fundamental  uncertainty,  individuals  are  simply  unable  to  do  what  Walrasian 
economics accredit to them: to optimally allocate recourses in time and space. Only 
the introduction of conventions and routines (such as prolonging past developments 
into  the  future  until  new  information  demands  adjustments),  institutions  (such  as 
collective  bargaining  systems),  rules  of  thump  and  anthropological  prerequisites 
                                                 
11 See Hayek (1968) for the notions of ‘teleocracy’ and ‘nomocracy’.  
12 For the relation of complexity to uncertainty in different Post Keynesian schools see Rosser 2006.   7 
(such as the famous ‘animal spirits’) enable humans to act nevertheless
13 – and it 
becomes  obvious  how  important  restrictions  on  human  behaviour  are  in  order  to 
form short and long term expectations and attribute a state of confidence to them. 
From a theoretical point of view, it is particularly the institution ‘money’ and the 
liquidity  premium  bestowed  on  it  determining  long-term  interested  rates  which 
marks the difference between a Walrasian barter economy and a Keynesian monetary 
production  economy.  From  a  political  perspective,  it  is  particularly  the  outcome 
which is important: a long-lasting situation of involuntary unemployment without 
any tendency of self-adjustment towards full market clearance, or: unemployment 
equilibrium rejecting Say’s and Walras’ law as the Keynesian ‘pattern prediction’. 
    
The  consequences  for  the  principals  of  Post  Keynesian  economic  policy  are  far-
reaching: 
 
•  Contrary to Hayekian pretensions, unfettered market interaction – even under 
the best possible circumstances – does not converge towards Pareto-optimal 
solutions but may waste productive capacity, skills and qualifications for very 
substantial  periods.  Providing  property  rights  and  contract  rules  in 
combination  with  securing  (perfect)  competition,  i.e.  structural  policy 
(Ordnungspolitik), is clearly not enough.  
•  The  objectives  of  economic  policy  are  no  longer  merely  functional 
derivatives of equilibrium solutions of individual egoistic behaviour but must 
be normatively chosen. Full employment is just as little the ‘natural’ outcome 
of labour markets in monetary production (i.e. capitalist) economies as any 
‘natural’ income distribution according to productivity measures exist.  
•  Although  markets  may  fail  when  information  is  missing,  competition  is 
restricted or adjustment mechanisms are obstructed, the Keynesian ‘pattern 
prediction’  does  not  follow  from  ‘market  failure’  but  is  the  result  of 
‘satisficing  behaviour’
14  of  individual  market  actors  confronted  with 
fundamental uncertainty.  
•  If societal objectives are not met automatically – which Keynesians believe 
they are most often not as unemployment will not be accepted as desired 
                                                 
13 As Keynes (1936: 149ff.) noted: „The outstanding fact is the extreme precariousness of the basis of 
knowledge on which our estimates of prospective yield have to be made. (…) If human nature felt no 
temptation to take a chance, no satisfaction (profit apart) in constructing a factory, a railway, a mine or 
a farm, there might not be much investment merely as a result of cold calculation.” In a recent article, 
Page (2008) elaborates extensively and exhaustingly on the fundamental distinction between ‘optimal 
behaviour’ and ‘rule-based behaviour’.   
14 This is to mean that agents can act only ‚bounded rationally’ (see Simon 1957, 1959). However, the 
use of money as the most liquid asset and the introduction of liquidity preferences as expression of the 
state of expectations and confidence renders human behaviour with respect to resource allocation as 
‘optimal’ as possible.  Therefore, the concept of ‘bounded rationality’ as used here does not merely 
refer  to  “behavioural  characteristics  of  agents”  (Dunn  2001:  568)  but  encompass  fundamental 
uncertainty. Yet this does  not leave decision-making hanging in the air:  “’Satisficing’ behaviour, 
making the most statisfactory choice out of those that are reasonably available, is the best we humans 
can do” (Moore 2006: 105).    8 
outcome
15 in most societies –, societies as principals and the states (or the 
governments)  as  agents  will  have  to  pursue  policies  directed  towards  the 
achievements of these objectives, i.e. quantitative, interventionist policy (or 
Prozesspolitik  in  German)  is  needed.  Yet,  the  political  actor  cannot  be 
pictured as ‘repair man’ simply correcting ‘market failures’ but must be seen 
as market participant whose aim is to alter the market outcome in a desired 
way. 
•  The economic action of any market participant has a measurable impact on 
macroeconomic  variables  such  as  national  income  or  GDP  growth, 
employment,  capital  accumulation  and  prices  or  inflation  rates.  Collective 
actors or the political actor are only distinct in the size of these effects – 
which clearly rules out the ‘neutral money’ and ‘(fiscal) policy inefficiency 
hypothesis’ of (rational expectation) Walrasian economics. 
•  As ‘market participant’ the political actor has no more direct control over the 
targeted  variables  as  any  other  individual  or  collective  actor;  or  to  put  it 
differently again: contrary to the Tinbergen-Theil world, there are no linear 
relations  between  exogenous  (instruments)  and  endogenous  variables 
(targets) in a complex environment on the one hand and once the unitary 
political actor is dispersed into two or more independent actors (such as the 
independent  Central  Bank,  the  government  and  other  semi-autonomous 
bodies) on the other hand, problems of policy coordination necessarily arise. 
 
To  sum  up: Post  Keynesian  theory  of  economic  policy  emphasises  the  need  and 
efficiency of quantitative, interventionist policies, yet does not ignore the limitations 
to  ‘controllability’,  i.e.  it  results  in  a  strong  plea  for  what  might  be  termed 
‘constrained  feasibility’  between  the  extremes  of  Cartesian  ‘controllability’  and 
Hayekian ‘non-decisionism’ – a ‘market participation theory of economic policy’. 
And it is this critical knowledge about the limits to policy control on the one hand 
and the acceptance of a quite different ‘pattern prediction’ as compared to Walrasian 
and  Hayekian  economics  on  the  other  hand  which  renders  the  following  critique 
unfounded:  
 
“In fact, the Post Keynesians’ own vision of pervasive uncertainty would 
seem to lean against such conclusions (traditional demand management; 
A.H.), for how, in a world of such uncertainty, could the government 
possibly  form  policies  that  are  compatible  with  full  employment  and 
price stability? (…) To claim that government can improve upon free-
market outcomes by reducing uncertainty, one must somehow infer that 
the government is able to obtain information that is unavailable to market 
participants in regard to future prospects” (Dempster 1999: 80).     
 
                            
5.  Creating market constellations 
                                                 
15 Although some individuals, societal groups or classes may not be interested in full employment; see 
Kalecki (1943); Heise (2008a).   9 
 
It  is  crucial  to  understand  the  different  implications  of  complexity  involving 
fundamental uncertainty on the one hand – something with which all the different 
market participants are faced similarly  – and the possibility to act purposefully – 
something which Hayek and the Hayekians apparently and mistakenly confine to 
private, individual actors in providing private goods only – on the other hand. But 
why should not the political actor – as ‘political entrepreneur’ – provide public goods 
just  as  well,  although  he  similarly  has  to  accept  the  possibility  of  missing  his 
objectives  as  any  private  actor  (as  consumer,  producer,  investor,  etc.)  else
16? No 
better knowledge or more appropriate information on the side of the political actor is 
needed, but a purpose to produce public goods: desired or targeted market outcomes 
which the market does not provide automatically! 
 
However, the metaphor of ‘providing public goods’
17 for ‘economic policy-making’ 
is a very useful one as it pinpoints the constraints which the political actor (as much 
as private actors) has to face: By supplying the money market with high-powered 
money,  by  buying  investment  and  consumption  goods  or  hiring  labour  for 
administrative purposes
18, by levying taxes and contributions or, more generally, by 
participating  in  market  processes  the  political  actor  will  certainly  impact  on  the 
national income and capital accumulation, on (direct and indirect) employment and 
wage developments, on prices and income distribution. Nonetheless, he cannot be 
sure about how much of the impact will fall on price- and how much on quantity 
measures
19, he cannot be sure – once there are more than one independent public 
bodies involved – how possible trade-offs are dealt with or whether the effects are 
symmetric in either direction of causation (i.e. expansionary or restrictive)
20. Outside 
the Tinbergen-Theil world, the political actor has lost absolute control, yet this does 
not imply the claim for entire abstinence:  
 
•  First and foremost, basic institutions must be created and secured in order to 
minimise the cost of economic interaction necessary in a world of extensive 
                                                 
16 And, of course, the political actor may be punished for his misjudgement (by loosing electoral 
votes) quite as much as the private actor (by loosing money); see Witt (2003: 82).  For the somewhat 
opaque notion of ‘political entrepreneur’ see Hederer (2008). 
17 Public goods can be ‚public utilities’ as well as ‚price stability’ or ‚full employment’. 
18 The political actor can also hire labour for productive purposes. In high times of privatisation and 
the  focus  on  the  allocation  instead  of  the  stabilisation  function  of  governmental  action,  public 
ownership of productive capacity is almost completely lost. 
19 In the General Theory, Keynes (1936: 305f.) at great length discusses this issue with respect to 
monetary  policy  by  elaborating  the  elasticity  of  (nominal  or,  as  he  called  it,  money)  prices  with 
respect to changes in the quantity of money: “Perhaps the best purpose served by writing them down 
is to exhibit the extreme complexity of the relationship between prices and the quantity of money, 
when we attempt to express it in a formal manner. It is, however, worth pointing out that of the four 
terms ed, ew, ee and eo upon which the effect on prices of changes in the quantity of money depends, ed 
stands for the liquidity factors which determine the demand for money in each situation, ew for labour 
factors (…) which determine the extent to which money-wages are raised as employment increases, 
and  ee  and  eo  for  the  physical  factors  which  determine  the  rate  of  decreasing  returns  as  more 
employment is applied to the existing equipment.” 
20 In Heise (2006a), the ‚constrained feasibility’ and asymmetric causation has been shown in detail.    10 
division  of  labour,  i.e.  property  rights,  contract  and  competition  laws  and 
their  ultimate  enforcement  –  this  seems  to  be  uncontested  throughout  the 
economic profession and calls for structural policies (Ordnungspolitik).  
•  Decision-making  under  the  conditions  of  complexity  and  fundamental 
uncertainty  is  exceedingly  hampered  due  to  ‘cognitive  scarcity’
21  and  the 
amount  of  courses  of  action  open  to  the  economic  agents.  Although 
‘cognitive scarcity’ cannot systematically be reduced, the political actor by its 
own means is not supposed to increase it either. This requires a rule-based, 
well-communicated  and  credible  provision  of  public  goods  as  opposed  to 
discretionary interventions of the teleological ‘market repair’ type and may 
be  called  the  ‘governance’  variant  of  quantitative  policies 
(ordnungspolitische Prozesspolitik).  
•  Moreover, in order to reduce the courses of action open to private market 
participants, institutions and regulations are needed. Although there is always 
a trade-off between the uncertainty-reducing nature of such institutions and 
regulations and the potential cost of regressed adaptability to market change 
and, therefore, cost-benefit analysis of institutions may turn out negatively
22, 
the  course  of  vindication  of  neoclassical  institutionalism  is  turned  upside 
down.      
•  Finally,  in  order  to  overcome  the  cooperation  problems  accruing  from  a 
multitude of independent public (and private, collective) actors, rules, norms 
or governance institutions are needed in order to enforce ‘irrationality without 
regret’, i.e. to turn non-cooperative games into cooperative ones.  
 
The specific set of norms and institutions which are purposefully created (external 
institutions)  in  combination  with  cultural  norms  and  conventions  (internal 
institutions) form the environment which has been termed ‘market constellations’ 
(see e.g. Heise 2008b)
23 and they help shaping the behaviour of private as well as 
political market participants. It is evident that such ‘market constellations’ have to be 
moulded  according  to  the  societal  objectives,  yet  facilitating  specific  market 
constellations (Gestaltbarkeit in German) should not be mixed up with ‘controlling’ 
certain outcomes (Machbarkeit), hence ‘constrained feasibility’ again.    
  
This cannot be the place to elaborate in full detail the features of different market 
constellations, their systematic impacts on market outcomes
24 and the specific use of 
                                                 
21 By ‚cognitive scarcity’ Wible (2004: 136ff.) combines the two elements of informational problems 
involved here: firstly, the sheer lack of information and, secondly, the computational restrictions of 
human beings.  
22  And  this  may  particularly  be  the  case  if,  as  in  reality,  institutions  and  regulations  are  not  the 
outcome of rational consideration but of power relations (Realpolitik). 
23 The term ‚market constellation’ sounds surely unfamiliar to most readers. It is intended to capture 
specific  market  outcomes  which  are  determined  by  certain  formal  and  informal  institutions.  An 
alternative term used fort he combination of institutions and outcomes is ‚regimes’ – but as this term 
has been appropriated by certain schools of thought (the French ‚Regulation’ school and the American 
‚Social Structure of Accumulation’ school), we would like to keep the somewhat cumbersome ‚market 
constellations’ term for distinction. 
24 This has been done in Heise (2006b; 2008b) and Heine/Herr/Kaiser (2006).   11 
instruments,  nevertheless  some  ideas  about  the  institutional  requirements  of  a 
‘functional’ market constellation
25 – i.e. external institutions shaped by the political 
actor  and  rule-based  quantitative  policies  –  can  be  derived  from  the  above 
expositions: 
 
•  In  order  to  reduce  the  range  of  possible  future  events  –  particularly  with 
respect  to  the  fundamentals  of  monetary  economies:  creditor-debtor-
relationships-,  the  valuation  of  goods,  services  and  assets  ought  to  be  as 
stable  as  possible.  Institutional  economics  as  well  as  empirical  evidence 
suggests that this can best be secured by granting independence to a Central 
Bank
26.  However,  this  appears  to  be  merely  a  necessary  but  insufficient 
condition: the potential principal-agent problem of Central Banks following 
their own (hidden) preferences must be tackled and financial markets must be 
regulated in order to prevent erratic and instable market behaviour. The still 
ongoing British experiment with instrument instead of target independence of 
the Bank of England appears not to have solved the principal-agent problem 
appropriately  (see  Heise  2008b:  108ff.),  financial  market  regulation  needs 
deeper investigation than can be provided at this point
27. 
•  Assuming  given  commodity  market  structures  and  mark-up  pricing, 
commodity  prices  are  dependent  on  nominal  unit  labour  costs.  Again, 
institutional  economics  and  vast  empirical  evidence  suggest  that  strong 
collective  actors  on  both  sides  of  the  labour  market  (corporatist  or 
encompassing  institutions)  are  best  suited  to  prevent  races  to  the  bottom, 
deflationary  scenarios  (nominal  anchor)  in  the  advent  of  high  and  rising 
unemployment  as  well  as  to  enable  the  internalisation  of  external  (price) 
effects  in  times  of  low  and  falling  unemployment.  Moreover,  corporatist 
collective bargaining institutions also shelter better against personal income 
dispersion  which  adds  to  demand  deficiencies  and  poverty.  Here,  Post 
Keynesian  recommendations  are  in  fact  contrary  to  those  based  on  self-
regulating  Walrasians  foundations  which  favour  a  deregulation  of  labour 
markets and a decentralisation of labour market institutions under the verdict 
of competition.  
                                                 
25 By ‚functional’ market outcomes, I refer to a notion used by Fritsche et al (2005: 70ff.). Having 
followed my expositions carefully, the inclined reader will be aware that I am slightly reluctant in 
using this expression as I have pointed out that there are – contrary to Walrasian welfare economics – 
no functional objectives in Post Keynesian policy-making but only normative ones. ‘Functional’ in the 
sense  meant  here  rather  refers  to  market  constellations  that  facilitate  full  employment  and  price 
stability – two macroeconomic targets which are pursued by most democratic governments at least as 
lip service.    
26 For a critical view see Wray (2007). 
27  Interestingly,  financial  market  regulation  is  covered  by  the  Post  Keynesian  literature  only 
marginally.  Even  Minsky’s  (1986: 313ff.)  expositions  remain  rather  scanty  (“…  it  is  easy  to  list 
objectives, but much more difficult to deliver – to establish institutions and to start processes which 
will achieve those objectives”; p. 287) and e.g. in only 3 out of 33 issues since 2000 of the Journal of 
Post Keynesian Economics, papers with related topics can be found. Even the ‘Keynesian’ Tobin Tax 
has received low and ambiguous attention (see Keynes 1936: 159f.; Davidson 1997; Dimand 2004).      12 
•  Monetary, fiscal and wage policies are caught in policy games. Institutions 
must be created in order to transform the non-cooperative structure of these 
policy games
28 into a cooperative one; otherwise neither of the actors can 
reach its highest utility level and, more important, full employment and price 
stability cannot be achieved simultaneously – commonly experienced market 
constellations which have sparked off a variety of NAIRU- and ‘conflicting 
claims’  approaches  in  the  economics  profession  (see  e.g.  Rowthorn  1977; 
Sawyer 2001). The institution – a ‘Macroeconomic Dialogue’, ‘Concerted 
Action’  or  ‘Social  Pact’
29  –  needs  to  establish  communication  among  the 
actors and set and monitor accepted policy rules for the actors. Again, the 
Post Keynesian recommendation of coordination contradicts the Walrasian 
assignment approach.  
 
Of  course,  from  a  Post  Keynesian  perspective,  not  only  cooperation  per  se  is 
important
30 but the ‘norms of contents’ describing this cooperation and forming the 
macroeconomic policy mix which is supposed to achieve a high and stable level of 
aggregate demand in order to combine full employment, price stability and fiscal 
sustainability.  The  instruments  are  not  at  all  novel,  but  so  is  their  rule-based, 
correlated  perspective  and  their  equi-proportionate  contributions  –  Post 
Keynesianism  can  neither  be  portrayed  as  ‘fiscalism’,  nor  as  primarily  monetary 
oriented
31:  a)  ‘active’  monetary  policy  according  to  an  employment-augmented 
Taylor or Post Keynesian rule, b) sustainable fiscal policy according to a ‘capital-
budgeting’ rule and c) wage policy according to a ‘distributional margin’ rule (see 
Heise (2008b: 95ff.) for more details on these rules and Atesoglu (2007) specifically 
for a Post Keynesian monetary policy rule).                      
 
 
6.  Post Keynesian economic policy: Governance of ‘constrained feasibility’ 
 
The  traditional  theory  of  economic  policy  is  based  on  Walrasian  equilibrium 
dynamics. In a deterministic interpretation, this enables linear means-ends-systems of 
quantitative economic policy to be applied in the short period of sticky expectations 
                                                 
28 In most cases, the policy games turn out to follow a Stackelberg leadership (of fiscal policy or wage 
policy), but non-cooperative Nash equilibria are also possible if there are no collective actors that are 
able and willing to take a Stackelberg lead. 
29  All  of  the  afore-mentioned  institutions  can  be  found  in  reality:  the  European  Union  has 
institutionalised a ‚European Macroeconomic Dialoque (EMD)’, the German ‘Stability and Growth 
Act’ allows for the establishment of a ‘Concerted Action’ and Austria or the Netherlands, for instance, 
have created ‘Social Pacts’ (the ‘Economic and Social Council’ in Austria and the ‘Socio-Economic 
Council’  and  the  ‘Stichting  van  de  Arbeid’  in  the  Netherlands)  in  order  to  coordinate  their 
macroeconomic policies. However, the results are very mixed indicating different and as the case may 
be inadequate institutionalisation.   
30 As mentioned above, the Walrasian policy assignment of restrictive monetary policy, zero-deficit 
(fiscal) policy and moderate wage policy can also be interpreted as particular form of cooperation, yet 
hampering growth and employment potentials.   
31 Standard Keynesians emphasised as much fiscal policy (see e.g. Friedman/Heller 1969) as Post 
Keynesians  (at  least  of  ‘horizontalist’  perspective)  emphasise  the  priority  of  monetary  policy  –  
notable exceptions are Arestis/Sawyer (2003; 2004a; 2004b) and Setterfield (2007).     13 
and institutional rigidities, moreover structural policies (de-regulation) and laissez-
faire in the long run. In its non-deterministic interpretation, the recommendation for 
structural  policies  and  non-intervention  is  extended  even  to  the  short  period  as 
complexity  according  to  this  approach  renders  any  systematic  intervention 
implausible. 
 
A Post Keynesian theory of economic policy rejects both such extreme approaches 
and replaces them with a theory of ‘market participation’ giving way to ‘constrained 
feasibility’ (see fig. 1). The political actor is no longer an ‘external’ one, simply 
correcting  market  failure  or,  even  more  restrictively,  providing  merely  the  legal 
framework for private  market participants, but he is a market participant himself 
who,  after  societal  objectives  have  been  chosen  through  a  democratic  process, 
pursues such objectives by facilitating market constellations. As facilitating market 
constellations  includes  the  establishment  or  support  of  institutions  to  foster 
cooperation  among  public  authorities  (such  as  the  Central  Bank  and  the  Fiscal 
authorities) as well as among public and private actors (such as the Central Bank and 
the labour market organisations) and among private (collective) actors (such as trade 
unions or employer organisations), this can no longer be termed a unidirectional, 
linear government process, but is a multidirectional governance process of rule-based 
coarse-tuning.    
       












Discretionary fine-tuning as in the hydraulic ISLM model of deterministic policy 
control has no place in a Post Keynesian theory of economic policy. However, a 
whiff of discretion comes in due to the working of the automatic stabilisers and feed-
back mechanisms built into policy rules (such as e.g. output gaps in the Taylor rule). 
Although a Post Keynesian theory of economic policy is closer to Hayek than to 
Tinbergen-Theil in terms of its ontological foundations – which is mirrored in the 
common  preference  for  norm-oriented  public  activities  -,  the  different  ‘pattern 
predictions’ of Post Keynesian and Hayekian economics distinguish them in terms of 
their deployment of such norms: active and resource-based market participation here, 
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